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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-EQuAL PRoTEcnoN-UsB oF PROPERTY AND PoLL
TAX L1srs FOR SELECTION OF JURORS-Brown, a Negro, was convicted of a
capital offense in Forsyth County, North Carolina. Having exhausted his state
remedies, he petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus
alleging, inter alia, systematic discrimination against Negroes serving on grand
and petit juries.1 This discrimination was claimed to result from the use of
property and poll tax lists as sources from which to draw jury panels. The district court denied his petition and was affirmed by the court of appeals.2 On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The use of
property and poll tax lists as sources of jury panels does not establish unconstitutional discrimination against Negroes serving on juries and does not require
reversal of a conviction obtained under that system. Brown v. Allen, (U.S.
1953) 73 S.Ct. 397.
Beginning with Strauder v. West Virginia in 1879,3 more than twenty
Supreme Court opinions have established the principle that discrimination
against Negroes serving on grand or petit juries constitutes a denial of equal
protection to Negroes tried under such circumstances and requires a reversal of
the conviction or a quashing of the indictment so obtained. 4 However, Negro
defendants are not entitled to have members of their race sitting on juries and
any attempt at proportional representation on jury panels according to population
is as invalid as total exclusion.5 The principle is that race is not to be considered
at all in the selection of jury panels. The Court has treated the question of
discrimination as one of fact and, over the years, has developed a significant
presumption to help determine that fact. A showing of long continued exclusion
of Negroes from jury panels creates a strong presumption of discrimination which
is difficult, if not impossible, to overcome by testimony on the part of those
charged with the duty of selecting jury panels. 6 In this case, however, it appeared that (I) the legislature had expanded the basis of the jury pool, formerly
limited to those who had paid their previous years' taxes, to include all persons
on the county poll and property tax lists, and (2) the jury commissioners in
Forsyth County had, in 1949, purged their jury panel lists and selected a new
panel from the property and poll tax lists. Evidently, these changes were the
1 Brown v. Crawford, (D.C. N.C. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 866.
2Brown v. Allen, (4th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 477.
3 IQ0 U.S. 303 (1879).
4 Supreme Court cases on this subject are cited in annotation, 94 L.Ed. 856, 857
(1949).
5 Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 70 S.Ct. 629 (1950). See 49 MicH. L. REv. 759
(1951).
6 In Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880), an uncontroverted allegation that no
Negroes had ever served on juries was held to raise a "prima facie" case showing racial
discrimination. A similar statement appears in Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct.
579 (1934). And the same allegation was, when proved, held to create a "strong presumption" of discrimination in the more recent case of Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463,
68 S.Ct. 184 (1947). See 8 LA. L. REv. 548 (1948) and 18 FoRDHAM L. Rllv. 278
(1949) for analysis of proof problems. The application of the doctrine in the state of
Arkansas is described in 3 Amt. L. REv. 201 (1949).
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result of a 1948 Supreme Court decision which invalidated a Forsyth County
conviction because of discrimination in the jury system.7 In the earlier case, the
evidence showed that separate lists had been used for Negro and white jurors,
that the jury pool contained two per cent Negroes and that 12 Negroes had
been called to jury duty in the preceding ten years. Under the revised system,
initial selection of the jury pool was made by a five year old child who publicly
drew slips containing the names of property owners and voters from a box. Thus,
in 1950, at the time of this trial, Negroes constituted 33 per cent of the population, 16 per cent of the property and poll tax payers of Forsyth County and from
9 to 17 per cent of persons drawn for jury service. These changes in the method
of selection of jurors were held to destroy the presumption of discrimination
which had led the Court to reverse the earlier conviction.8 Petitioner's basic argument was that, because of economic and educational discrimination, the proportion of Negroes who were voters and property owners would, as in this case, be
less than the percentage of Negroes in the population and that this fact made
the system of selection invalid. Justice Reed, writing for the six man majority,
recognized this fact but held it insufficient to invalidate the system. He qualified
his conclusion that the use of poll and property tax lists as the sources of jury
panels was constitutional by assuming that (I) the lists were non-discriminatory as to race and (2) that the taxes were reasonable. Beyond racial discrimination, he said, states are constitutionally free to select their potential jurors as
they see fit, so long as the source reflects a cross-section of the community in
terms of character and intelligence. 9 Justices Black and Douglas dissented on
7 Brunson v. North Carolina, 333 U.S. 851, 68 S.Ct. 634 (1948), reversed, per curiam,
the state court decision in 227 N.C. 558, 43 S.E. (2d) 82 (1947) which, in turn, was a
per curiam decision relying on State v. Koritz, 227 N.C. 552, 43 S.E. (2d) 77 (1947).
The latter case upheld a jury selection system which included separate lists of Negro and
white jurors. See 26 N.C. L. REv. 185 (1948), for analysis of state court decisions in
North Carolina prior to the Brunson case.
s The effect of the changed method of selecting jurors as rebutting the presumption
of discrimination is more clearly pointed out in Speller v. Allen, (U.S. 1953) 73 S.Ct. 397,
a companion case decided in the same opinion as the principal case The Speller case
involved a death sentence in another North Carolina county. Defendant showed that no
Negroes had served on Vance County juries for a number of years and that this case was
the first one in recent years on which Negroes had been summoned. The Court held that
since this jury panel was the first one picked after the change in the system as outlined in
the text of this note, the history of discrimination was not conclusive. "Past practice is
evidence of past attitude of mind. That attitude is shown to no longer control the action
of officials by the present fact of colored citizens' names in the jury box." Speller v. Allen,
(U.S. 1953) 73 S.Ct. 397 at 419. The point was virtually assumed by the majority in the
principal case at 416.
9 In the Speller case, note 8 supra, a unique problem was presented when the jury
commissioner's clerk testified that he had filled the jury box involved with the names of
persons from the tax list who had "the most property." No objection was taken to this by
the defense at any stage in the proceedings and therefore the majority did not consider it.
The language of the majority opinion indicates that if an objection had been properly raised,
it would have been sustained. Speller v. Allen, (U.S. 1953) 73 S.Ct. 397 at 420. And see
Justice Black's dissent at 433. On the question of economic discrimination, see Thiel v.
Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 66 S.Ct. 984 (1946); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S.
261, 67 S.Ct. 1613 (1947); and 32 MINN. L. REv. 297 (1948).
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the grounds that "partial abandonment" of the discriminatory practices was
insufficient to show that the selective process was not based on racial discrimination.10 They joined Justice Frankfurter in a dissent on procedural grounds. 11
The facts of this case, compared to earlier practices in North Carolina, indicate
that a substantial degree of progress toward eliminating race as a criteria for jury
service has been made under the leadership of the Supreme Court. The majority
opinion indicates that the Court will not gear constitutional requirements to
mathematical proportions but, rather, will give considerable leeway to the states
where an attempt has been made to put the jury selection system on an objective
basis, thus lessening the opportunity for discrimination which exists when the
choice of the jury panel depends on the personal selection and opinion of the
jury commissioners.12
Alfred W. Blumrosen, S.Ed.

10 Justice Black wrote: "Certainly discriminatory results remained. I do not believe
the Court should permit this tax list technique to be treated as a complete neutralizer of
racial discrimination." Principal case at 432. This appears to be an overstatement of the
majority position. His conclusion as to remaining discrimination is based on the difference
in proportion of Negroes in the population and on the jury panel. If he would require the
states to have roughly the same proportion of Negro jurors as there are Negroes in the
population in order to satisfy his concept of equal protection, the result would be a jury
system based on racial categories-the very thing that the Supreme Court has been striving
to prevent. See Cassell v. Texas, note 5 supra. Because. both total exclusion of Negroes
from jury service and the inclusion of a number of Negroes proportionate to the population
indicate that race is a factor in the selection process, the writer doubts that the Court can,
with present techniques, reduce discriminatory selection much beyond the point reached in
the principal case.
11 A six to three majority in the principal case held, inter alia, that a denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court from a decision by the state court of last resort should have
no substantive effect in subsequent proceedings. Justice Frankfurter's dissent was based on
the fact that the court of appeals in the present case did give some effect to a previous
denial of certiorari.
•
12 See, for instance, Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 61 S.Ct. 164 (1940); Norris v.
Alabama, note 6 supra; and Patton v. Mississippi, note 6 supra.

